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REAPPRAISAL OF SOVIET GROUND FORCES

THE PROBLEM

1. To review the pertinent intelligence studies and the all-source evidence pertaining to the manpower, equipment, costs, and the qualitative aspects of the Soviet ground forces, to prepare a thorough re-evaluation with special emphasis on the ranges of uncertainty associated with our estimates of these forces for the Mid-1963 time period, and to establish recommendations for new priorities in collection and processing as appropriate.

SCOPE


2. This study is to be limited to the Soviet ground forces, that is, the counterpart of the US General Purpose Forces, Army. Tactical missile units integral to the ground forces will be included, but Tactical Air Forces and Army Aviation are to be excluded.

TIME SPAN

3. The time period to be examined includes, insofar as necessary, the past decade because:

a. Secretary McNamara's staff has asked for an expenditures series covering the period back to 1950 - the years immediately prior (1948-49) are necessary to obtain a good fix on 1950. The Secretary's staff is interested in probable Soviet responses to alternate US courses of action and whether or not such responses are within Soviet economic capabilities. Historical changes in the size and composition of Soviet ground forces are among the key ingredients for the determination.

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b. SecDef also requires a review and an understanding of the kinds, quality, and patterns of evidence on the Soviet ground forces within the recent past.

c. A review of the recent development of the Soviet ground forces is needed to understand the present stage of organizational and technical development.

DIRECTION AND RESPONSIBILITY

4. The study is to be conducted by a panel of CIA/DIA personnel under the co-chairmanship of the senior CIA member and the senior DIA member. The responsibility of the panel will be:

a. To prepare the interim report and final study based on all-source contributions as indicated in paragraph 8, and in so doing to effect the following.

b. To hear detailed briefings by CIA, DIA, NSA, etc. on the evidence and examine the evidence as necessary.

c. To evaluate the evidence as it pertains to the objectives of this study.

d. To examine the impact of alternative assumptions in key instances.

e. To evaluate the effect of new or incompletely exploited intelligence information on the ranges of uncertainty.

f. To offer continuing guidance and counsel to CIA and DIA analysts and give briefings when requested.

5. CIA and DIA components will be assigned responsibility for supporting the study within their prime areas of competence (See Outline, paragraph 8.) The OSD staff ~~members~~ who are made

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available to the project will function as observers. In this role they will assist in the provision of comparative and analogous cost and other US information, will assist in aligning the OSD requirements and the objectives of the project, and will keep the OSD staff and the project panel abreast of significant developments relating to the project.

6. The questions which have prompted this re-evaluation cover all aspects of the ground forces, but can be incorporated within the general sub-headings: A. Organization and Posture, B. Equipment Production and Inventories, and C. Costs. Much of the breadth of the subject, the material to be examined, and the judgments asked for are likely to require an extended period of study. Thus, the request for a preliminary report in August, 1963 necessitates setting limited objectives for that time.

7. The remaining four months in which the panel will be preparing its final report will provide time to concentrate on exploitation of new evidence relating to the subject of the August report and to complete the re-appraisal of (a) combat support and rear area units; (b) mobilization; (c) doctrine and strategy; and (d) implications for the future.

8. The following outline provides the framework of the August 1963 interim report. Preliminary all-source contributions are to be submitted to the Panel by the agency indicated by 1 July 1963. A similar outline subsequently will be prepared for the final comprehensive report to be completed 1 December 1963.

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Organization and Posture of Soviet Active Line Divisions

1. Command and Control

Historical Developments (CIA/DIA)

Types (DIA)

Strengths (DIA)

Costs (CIA)

Ranges of Uncertainty and Methodology (CIA/DIA)

Validity Considerations and Alternative Possibilities (CIA/DIA)

2. Tactical Units

Historical Developments (CIA/DIA)

Types (DIA)

Strengths (DIA)

Costs (CIA)

Ranges of Uncertainty and Methodology (CIA/DIA)

Validity Considerations and Alternative Possibilities (CIA/DIA)

3. Effectiveness

Readiness (DIA)

Deployment (DIA)

Staying Power (DIA)

4. Trends (CIA/DIA)

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